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P. 788: "Those apparently repugnant moments . . . are not inseparable": read "are not separable."

These points are mostly trivial, and I do not think that there are any amendments of greater importance to suggest.

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MATTER AND MEMORY. Henri Bergson. Authorized translation.

By Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1911. Pp. xx, 339. (Library of Philosophy.)

In view of the great interest recently aroused in the English-speaking countries by the work of M. Bergson and the laudation bestowed on it by Professor James, the publishers are to be thanked for following up the translation of "*Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*" with this version of what is in some ways M. Bergson's most remarkable performance. In the main the translators may be congratulated on their accomplishment of the extraordinarily difficult task of reproducing a French work in readable English. I would note, however, as minor blemishes, several cases in which undue adherence to the phrasing of the original has led them to produce sentences where the grammatical subject is placed after its predicate. This is a type of structure common in good French prose, but rigidly eschewed by writers with a sense of English style, and the places where it occurs should be modified whenever the book comes to be reissued. It is one of the chief rules which a careful translator ought never to forget that the ideal of translation is to be not only faithful, but idiomatic; no construction should be allowed which compels the reader to remember that what he has before him is a version and not an original work. I note also one or two unfelicities in vocabulary which might readily be removed. 'Back and forth' is, to the sense of the British reader, at any rate, a provincialism for 'backwards and forwards'; on pages 214, 216 the verb 'to accrue' is used in a transitive sense which is, I believe, unknown to our language, and the same thing is true of the sense put upon the verb 'to interest' at the end of the first paragraph of page 293. You can say in good English that the mathematical concept of absolute homogeneous space is 'of interest for' our practical interaction with the material world, but to say 'it interests a

being which acts on matter, but not the work of a mind which speculates on its essence' is to perpetrate an ugly grammatical ambiguity. It is not permissible English to speak of a concept as 'interesting the work of a mind.' It will, I hope, be taken as a compliment to the excellence of the translation as a whole that a reviewer should think it worth while to call attention to these few incidental lapses.

The appearance of the translation is hardly the proper occasion for a detailed criticism of the theories contained in the work translated, especially when it happens to be already so well known as M. Bergson's "*Matière et Mémoire*," but I may perhaps be allowed to make one or two general remarks about the worth of the line of thought which has M. Bergson for its most brilliant exponent among our contemporaries. In particular, I should like to say that the more I read M. Bergson's utterances, the more surprised I find myself by the acceptance he has won from our Pragmatists. Apart from his tendency to exaggerate the differences which separate the speculative from the operative attitude towards the material world, it appears to me that Bergson's philosophical position involves all the positions of Mr. Bradley against which Pragmatism holds itself specially bound to protest. Thus, in place of the pragmatist identification of truth with utility, Bergson offers us the definite view that because of the supposed antithesis between knowing and acting, we must turn our backs on the one if we would succeed in the other. When we have to act we must forget all the refinements and distinctions which thought has created in its endeavor after science, and put ourselves back at the supposed level of primitive 'immediacy' which had to be abandoned as the first step to the formulation of reasoned knowledge. All the distinctions introduced by thought vanish in an indescribable and unanalyzable 'continuum.' On the fundamental point that the real is an absolutely undifferentiated One, continuous in some sense of which it can only be said that it is *not* the continuity which the understanding can grasp and analyze (the continuum of Cantor and of pure mathematics generally), and that all analysis and abstraction involve falsification, Bradley and Bergson are really in complete accord. For all Bergson's insistence on change and motion, it is only the want of rigid precision in his expressions which conceals the fact that he is at heart as much an Eleatic as Mr. Bradley. He speaks, indeed,

in the book before us, with an undeserved contempt of the famous 'sophisms' of Zeno; but the truth is that these 'sophisms' were immediate deductions from his own thesis of the 'indivisibility' of real movement. In fact, the Monism of Bergson is much more fatal to the validity of science than that of Mr. Bradley. For Mr. Bradley has always held that the return to the 'immediacy' of feeling which would remove the element of error from our apprehension of reality is to be somehow combined with a retention of the results won by the discursive understanding in its devious wandering. In the *visio beatifica*, which is the goal of philosophy, we have an 'immediacy' of a higher order than that of primitive undifferentiated 'feeling'; the results of the progressive differentiation which is science are all to persist, though no doubt 'transcended' in a mode of apprehension which cannot be described in language intelligible to reason. But what Bergson demands as the condition of apprehending reality seems to be rather the absolute sacrifice of all the results of thought, a mere return to a mental condition of pure unintelligence, more rudimentary, it may well be, than that of the mollusc. And thus for him it should be a more real difficulty than for Mr. Bradley why, since this condition of bare feeling (the condition assigned by Leibniz to the naked monad) of itself gives us reality whole and indivisible, we should even have committed the *peccatum originale* of trying to escape from it. Mr. Bradley does not at least hold that *vanitas vanitatum* would be an adequate epitaph for the grave of human intelligence; M. Bergson ought to hold it, if he really means what his metaphors always imply, and what, on the rare occasions when he can resist the temptation to let a metaphor usurp the place of a reasoned exposition, he says in so many words.

What has always seemed to me the fundamental defect of M. Bergson as a philosopher, though it is, no doubt, a 'defect of his qualities,' is his lack of thorough grounding in epistemological criticism. It is probable that his very fertility in imaginative metaphor makes the work of steady logical analysis of the problems and assumptions of science distasteful to him. But the consequence which is likely to follow from this peculiarity is that his merits as a philosopher will appear far less to future generations of critics than they do to contemporaries. It is natural for us to give a very high place to

a writer who has thrown out so many striking suggestions and hinted at so many 'points of view' which look novel and promising, but the real court which will have in the end to pass its verdict on M. Bergson's claim to rank as a great philosopher will be more concerned with the coherency and permanent value of an interpretation of life than with its temporary freshness and suggestiveness, and I am not sure that it may not go harder with him before that court than any of us to-day would naturally expect. Many of his most striking suggestions will, I fear, be found of little lasting worth, just because they arise out of an uncritical formulation of the problems which demand our solution. Thus it sounds on first hearing as though the distinction between 'real duration,' with its innumerably various 'tensions' or rates of progress, and the unreal scientific 'scheme' of an absolute time which, in Newton's phrase, "flows equably," were an utterance of profound genius and probably only required to be developed in order to solve all the difficulties which philosophers have raised about the relation of the time-process to 'reality.' Yet when we find that the differences of 'tension' are themselves afterwards spoken of as variations of 'rapidity,' we cannot help asking whether 'absolute time' and its 'equable flow' are not being tacitly retained as implicit in the very concepts by which we were to escape from them. So it seems at first illuminating to learn that the uniform three-dimensional space and homogeneous motions of physical science, which appear to stand in such pointed contrast with the infinitely various qualitative differences of the sensible world are only a diagrammatic Schematism which science mistakenly insists on taking for a reality behind the veil of appearances. But when we come to study the actual use made by science of these concepts, we do not find them figuring in the character of a reality behind the veil, but modestly functioning as a system of invariants *within* experience, and in this quality they reveal themselves as not only harmless, but indispensable. We may reasonably ask ourselves whether the alleged difficulties and contradictions of our intellectual scheme of categories do not arise merely from misconceptions which the intellect itself is progressively removing as the task of detecting the way in which our categories actually function in scientific work is executed by philosophical criticism. It may be that all the alleged contradictions can be trusted to vanish if we will only

be absolutely faithful to the principles of a critical philosophy, and that we have no motive to seek to undo the work of science by attempting the impossible task of plunging back into the 'immediacy' of unintelligent feeling. That "percepts without concepts are blind," that no intelligent experience can possibly be 'pure' in M. Bergson's sense of the word, are lessons which, I should have supposed, we had all learned long ago from Kant, and I cannot conceive that later thought will ever forget the lesson for long together. It is time we asked ourselves once more whether the antithesis between 'thought' and 'action' which some of our most brilliant contemporaries seem to regard as absolute is not in the end purely fallacious, whether we are not coming perilously near forgetting the significance of the great idea of a 'practical *reason*.' M. Bergson is, I feel, at least on the verge of a serious error when he insists on distinguishing the man whose memory and imagination are enslaved to the demands of the adaptation of the bodily mechanism to its immediate environment as the 'man of action' from the 'dreamer,' the man of free memories and imaginative vision, and when he similarly makes absolute the severance of the needs of speculation from the needs of life. Is speculation then not also life? Must we take it that after all man *does* live by bread alone, and that art and religion, no less than science, are but 'dreams'? At least, let us not forget that they are the visions of men dreaming greatly, and that the secularism which would rule them out of the life of action may unwittingly be denying to life just that which gives it its value.

Probably the most fruitful thought of the present volume will be found in the theory it propounds as to the relation of brain to mind. The suggestion that the exclusive function of the brain is to act as a center for the coördination of motor responses does seem to add a new alternative to the list of previously existing theories of psychophysical connection, and one which may prove of very great value when thoroughly thought out. But it is not equally clear that M. Bergson has thought out his theory with the requisite thoroughness. On his theory we still have to ask what precisely the psychological character of perception is. Granting that, from the physiological side, the cerebral concomitant of a perception is simply the establishment of a motor reaction on stimulus, it should be clear that at least the cerebral processes by which the re-

sponse is established are not the object of the perception, and there thus remains the necessity of a psychological, though not of a psycho-physiological theory of perception. What I fail to find expressed with any clearness is M. Bergson's answer to the question whether the immediate object of cognition is a physical thing or a presentation, and, if it is the latter, whether a presentation is or is not an internal state of the soul? M. Bergson, I fancy, partly blinds himself to the fact that he has not answered this question by confusing it with an entirely different one which he has attempted to answer: the question why some of the objective relations between things are perceived by us while others are not. Yet it should be clear that even the fullest answer to *this* problem leaves the more ultimate question what it is that we do when we perceive unsolved. And I am not clear that M. Bergson has said the last word even on the question he does answer. We perceive, he says, those relations in which we are interested. If this meant merely that we perceive what we must react on if the life of the organism is to be preserved, it would clearly be an inadequate statement, since so much of what we perceive has but little significance from this biological point of view, and so much that is of moment is normally imperceptible. If we understand the formula in a wider sense, the retort seems obvious that in many cases we appear to be interested because we antecedently perceive, and not *vice versa*. I am interested in things because I find them here; I do not find them here because by some inexplicable free choice I have resolved that I will be interested in them. A philosophy which shuts its eyes to this fact is inevitably driven, however sorely against its intention, to reproduce the central absurdity of the scheme of Schopenhauer, the doctrine of the generation of a purely contemplative intelligence from a blind impulse which we honor too much when we dignify it with the names of 'will' and 'action.' So much it seems relevant to say here, not in disparagement of M. Bergson's many and brilliant gifts, but by way of a plea for a more thorough and systematic criticism of the categories alike of scientific thought and of ethical and social valuation as the indispensable preliminary of an abiding philosophical synthesis. The late William James did good service to philosophy by preaching to us all the necessity of faith; what is needed to-day is that the message should be completed by one who will preach

not merely faith, but faith in reason as the condition of philosophical 'salvation.' In so far as the revolt against the recently dominant forms of Hegelianism means a return to a genuine theism and a real teleology I for one cannot but sympathize with it; only I would say, let us beware of the suggestion that the way to behold the 'Father of lights' lies through putting out the eye of the soul.

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RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc.
London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910. Pp. xxvii, 478.

This is a partially revised edition of a book which first appeared twenty years ago. In his preface Dr. Schiller explains and apologizes for republication; he was impelled, he says, by a sense of duty towards the public which demanded it. If the reader wants to know to what extent the revision represents Dr. Schiller's present views on metaphysical questions, his curiosity will remain unsatisfied. We are told, indeed, that "the central doctrines are essentially maintained and may be taken to attest the stability of the author's personality"; but it would be a mistake to suppose that when Dr. Schiller says that his central doctrines are maintained he means that he thinks them quite true. For he says: "I now wholly disbelieve in the possibility of framing a system that can . . . lay claim to absolute truth and certainty." We may take it, however, that he still attaches some value to his system over and above the fact that it proves his personality to be stable, for otherwise he would scarcely have felt it a duty to undergo the labor of revision. It is, therefore, incumbent on a reviewer to try to estimate its value.

The central positions which he wishes to establish seem to be as follows. The world can only be properly understood if we regard it as in process of evolution. And its evolution takes place in a finite period of time; *i. e.*, the world must have had a beginning and will have an end. The goal of this process, which will some day be reached, is a perfect society of perfect individuals. Further, evolution, thus understood, "proves irrefragably that no evolution was possible without a preëxistent Deity" (p. 197). And it can also be proved that God, who